Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield Crisis Group Asia Report N°314, 18 May 2021 Page 20 linked pages, but it had refrained from banning the Tatmadaw entirely. Over the following two years, it also removed at least six military-run networks that had been engaging in “coordinated inauthentic behaviour”.89 The military responded by setting up a page for its “True News Information Team”, which gradually rebuilt the following that had been lost when Min Aung Hlaing’s page was removed in 2018.90 On 24 February, however, Facebook announced it was officially banning the Tatmadaw from Facebook and Instagram, and removing military-controlled media accounts such as Myawady and MRTV, with immediate effect.91 On 14 April, it announced that it would also remove “praise, support and advocacy” of violence by either the security forces or protesters in the future.92 This decision to ban the Tatmadaw has had implications for pro-military accounts, known in Myanmar as “lobby” pages, that often propagate pro-military disinformation. Civil society groups monitoring such content report that since the coup, Facebook has been very responsive in taking action, in part because the new policy makes decisions on removal much more straightforward.93 Facebook’s efforts over the past several years to identify and remove military proxies pushing disinformation or engaging in coordinated inauthentic behaviour have also significantly diminished the Tatmadaw’s ability to reach mass audiences.94 Although Facebook’s ability to detect recidivism could be improved, these accounts now struggle to build a following when they try to re-establish themselves; pages that once had millions of followers now often attract a maximum of 1,000 before they are removed.95 Despite the restricted operating space, the military has still been able to propagate disinformation campaigns, using a combination of social and state-controlled media. One prominent example was a campaign in early March that aimed to shift the blame for protester deaths away from security forces. Social media accounts posted the more extreme claims, such as assertions of the involvement of a non-state armed group, while concurrent articles in state media exonerated the security forces and said further investigation was ongoing.96 Amid the internet blackout and the Facebook ban, the military has also resorted to distributing pamphlets laying out its justification for seizing power.97 89 Facebook defines coordinated inauthentic behaviour as “when groups of pages or people work together to mislead others about who they are or what they are doing”. 90 “Tatmadaw returns to Facebook after two-year absence”, Myanmar Times, 9 June 2020. 91 The ban applies to accounts that are representing the Tatmadaw – either institutional pages, or individual users who are using their accounts to post information about the Tatmadaw. Individual soldiers using Facebook for personal purposes are not automatically removed. See also “Myanmar military banned from Facebook and Instagram with immediate effect”, op. cit. 92 Ibid. 93 Crisis Group interview, social media researcher, March 2021. 94 Although networks engaging in coordinated inauthentic behaviour often spread disinformation, Facebook removes them because of their behaviour – for example, misleading users on their identity or location – rather than the content they are posting. 95 Crisis Group interview, civil society member, March 2021. 96 “Disinformation campaign tries – and fails – to shift blame for protester deaths”, Frontier Myanmar, 7 March 2021. 97 See tweet by Athens Zaw Zaw, Deutsche Presse-Agentur journalist, @zawathens, 6:43pm, 14 April 2021.