24 M. SCHISSLER frequency with which people in Myanmar encountered in-group policing? Similar ques­ tions could be asked about how Facebook’s design led to the promotion of specific examples of in-group policing. To how many people did Facebook broadcast the images of traitors being pilloried in Rakhine State during 2012 and after, for example? Or: how many people encountered images related to the campaign against the peace activists and their comrades in 2014? Why did Facebook’s algorithms promote such images in this way? The lawsuits on behalf of the Rohingya have also raised the question of what Meta knew and when and, therefore, what it could meaningfully have done to act earlier. Highlighting the significance of in-group policing also highlights the significance of early warnings that Meta did receive. In mid-2014, for example, a collective of activists in Myanmar were told they had a “special queue” for reporting dangerous content to the company. One of the first concerns they raised was the broad issue of in-group policing, including the attacks using photographs likely looted earlier that year from the offices of humanitarian organiz­ ations in Rakhine State (Figure 3). Company employees initially refused to remove the post, citing policies that made such content allowable; even with the promise of a “special queue,” the posts were only removed after more than six weeks.97 Four years later, activists had to resort to an open letter after continued frustrations with how the company was responding to their warnings, prompting a public apology from CEO Mark Zuckerberg.98 Yet, at almost the same moment, the UN Fact-Finding Mission was having a similar experi­ ence, as the activist alleged to have helped its investigation was being attacked on Face­ book. Only following several weeks of attempts, and working directly with a contact at the company, was the Mission able to get the posts removed. Several months later, meanwhile, at least sixteen examples of the attacks continued to circulate.99 This article also suggests important queries for better understanding how the Myanmar military may have used Facebook, which have relevance for ongoing attempts to pursue accountability for crimes against humanity and genocide.100 On at least seven occasions between 2018 and 2021, Meta removed clusters of accounts involved in “coor­ dinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate” in Myanmar.101 Only limited information about these accounts has been available, but independent research has also documented that the Myanmar military made extensive use of Facebook,102 operat­ ing out of both military installations inside the country and in Russia,103 where it has long 97 Stecklow, “Why Facebook Is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar.” Disclosure: the author was involved with these efforts. 98 Kevin Roose and Paul Mozur, “Zuckerberg Was Called Out Over Myanmar Violence. Here’s His Apology,” The New York Times, 9 April 2018. 99 IIFFMM, 342. 100 See, Kanishka Kewlani, “Three Avenues to Justice for the Rohingya,” Bulletin of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 17 February 2022. 101 Meta, “July 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report,” Newsroom (July 2021), 4–6; Meta, “An Update on the Situation in Myanmar,” Newsroom (31 March 2021). 102 Digital Forensic Research Lab, “Inauthentic Anti-Rohingya Facebook Assets in Myanmar Removed” (Atlantic Council, 5 May 2020); Naw Betty Han, “Coordinated Behaviour: Inside the USDP’s Well-Paid Army of Social Media Monitors,” Frontier Myanmar, 22 September 2020; Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Mili­ tary”; Unleash Research Labs, Unleashed: Blink Hacker Group (Sweden, 2016). 103 Aiden Moe, “Facebook ကို အသုံးပြု၍ စနစ်တကျ ချိတ်ဆက်ဆောင်ရွက်သော ဝါဒဖြန့်ချိုမှုများအား လေ့လာချက်,” Inde­ pendent Journal of Burma Studies 1 (2021); Wai Moe, “Militarization in Northern Rakhine State: How, Who and Why,” Independent Journal of Burma Studies 1 (2021); Aung Kaung Myat, “Investigation: A Network of Pro-Military Facebook Pages in Myanmar with Russian Connections,” Annie Lab, 20 February 2020.