Understanding the spread of hate speech, propaganda and disinformation through social media, and the trajectory of government responses to its spread, can provide us with useful analytical tools to make more effective responses to these harmful practices and reduce the discrimination and violence they provoke. The pervasiveness of hate speech, propaganda and disinformation in contemporary global politics is one of the major challenges to democracy at present, and requires attention to insure that it does not precipitate a “downward spiral” in democracy and usher in a new age of “digital authoritarianism” (Freedom House, 2018; 2019). Countering Hate Speech and Disinformation in Politics and Elections: Global Trends The rise of hate speech and disinformation fueled by social media has featured in recent elections across a wide range of countries, including the United States, Denmark, India, Kenya, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Political elites, hate groups, and foreign governments have all played a role in fostering a divisive and hate-filled campaign period for a range of political ends. In Denmark, fake Islamist propaganda from cloaked Facebook pages led to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments (Farkas, Schou and Neumayer, 2017), while the success of the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party pressured leading political parties into more strident anti-immigrant positions in the 2019 elections (Haugbolle, 2019). In India, Hindu nationalist parties capitalized on anti-Muslim and anti-minority hate speech and disinformation on social media to register their most resounding victory (Goel and Rahman, 2019; Goel and Frankel, 2019). Recent Sri Lankan political developments include a rise in anti-Muslim and anti-Christian hate speech and disinformation, as well as hate speech coming from those involved in the April 2019 Easter bombings (Vignaraja, 2019). The recent bombings there and the rise of anti-minority sentiment will likely lead to a change through the ballot box, with ethnonationalist parties likely to increase their influence. In the Kenyan presidential elections of 2017, groups connected with incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta used extensive disinformation campaigns such as “Uhuru for Us” and “The Real Raila” to connect Kenyatta’s opponent Raila Odinga with the spectre of ethnic violence, discouraging voters from supporting the long-time opposition candidate (Privacy International, 2017). In recognition of the rise of hate speech and disinformation in elections and its detrimental impact on elections and democracy, governments, civic leaders, the media, and other 3

Select target paragraph3