of Europe programme on cybersecurity, particularly focused on the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. 394 Regulations are needed to govern the use of surveillance to ensure any infringement of privacy rights is legal, necessary and proportionate and the act of surveillance is not abused to cover people who are not suspected of carrying out a crime but whom the government may disagree with. The Government has already committed to requiring judicial authorisation of any request for lawful interception, which is an important first step. Given the weak state of the Myanmar judiciary, it is clear that any judicial authorities involved in such authorisation processes will require thorough training, both in the technicalities of lawful interception, but also in the importance of the legal safeguards that an independent review represents. See Chapter 4.9 on Stakeholder Engagement and Access to Remedy for a short overview of the judiciary. The idea of a judicial authority challenging and even denying authorisation to the executive branch to carry out surveillance for what the government claims is a national security issue or emergency, will be an unfamiliar concept in Myanmar. Even in countries with highly developed judicial systems, there is little open scrutiny of the decisions made by judicial authorities on lawful interception. The challenges of establishing a gatekeeping system in Myanmar that respects rights and establishing a proportional, targeted approach to security are therefore significant. The companies involved in executing lawful interception requests may currently be one of the few credible counterpoints in the system. (See Section C providing Surveillance Recommendations for ICT Companies) The Annex to the Recommendations also suggests the main issues for the Government of Myanmar to take into account in developing lawful interception law and procedures. B. Field Research Findings Current Status of Lawful Interception in Myanmar Human Rights Implicated: Right to Privacy, Freedom of Expression Key Findings  Many people in Myanmar grew up under a repressive surveillance regime, and are familiar with methods of physical surveillance, such as being followed. However, the majority do not know how digital surveillance is carried out and who has access to their data, phone records, etc.  There is a prevailing lack of trust between the public and the government, as well as a belief that the government will not protect or respect citizens’ privacy or personal data. There is a feeling among the general public that there is still physical surveillance and that government agencies likely monitor their digital communications.  There is no oversight body (parliamentary or otherwise) for lawful interception, and no clear process in place.  There is currently a lack of legal framework for lawful interception: In May 2015 with support from international consultants, MCIT held an initial “fact finding” session, focused on cyber-crime and electronic evidence, in which MCRB participated. The next steps are unclear. In the interim, PTD has requested 394 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (CETS 185) (2001). CHAPTER 4.4: SURVEILLANCE – LAWFUL INTERCEPTION & OTHER SURVEILLANCE METHODS 175 4 4.4