tested areas continues to put civilian lives in jeopardy and local populations are already exposed to risk of injury, displacement, or death at a time when COVID19 has become a health emergency for the rest of the world. Barriers to receiving information on healthcare have also included an internet shutdown in more than twenty conflict-affected townships in Central Myanmar and Karenni and Chin states since September 2021. The reduced labour forces in the media sector have led to a heavy reliance on content provided by citizen journalists. While news stories are hard to verify in both rural and urban settings, the capacity of the media to observe authoritarian tendencies — that undermine human rights and dignity — has been weakening. When the ethical media fades, misinformation and disinformation find more fertile ground to grow. THE IMPACT OF INTERNET BLACKOUTS ON DIGITAL MEDIA To silence opposition voices, the junta has intermittently cut internet access since day one of the coup. This “information gap” was caused by the junta’s countrywide mobile internet blackout, imposed over more than 50 days in April and May. According to NetBlocks, a global internet monitor, different types of restrictions have been imposed by the authorities, from a total or partial shutdown, to blocking certain online platforms, and limiting public Wi-Fi. Fibre to the Home (FTTH) internet services were shut down between 01:00–9:00 a.m. daily for more than 70 nights from 15 February to 27 April. Mobile data was cut for the whole country for 45 days during March– April. The longest ban was imposed on public Wi-Fi, lasting more than two months from 17 March. Moreover, China-style “whitelisting”, internet censorship, and mobile phone surveillance, which recently resumed under the NLD, have been accelerated by the junta.27 Popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have been blocked and are only accessible via VPN (virtual private networks). Since February, mobile phone service providers have been forced by the military government to use equipment which intercepts communications. As activating such mechanisms is subject to Norwegian and European sanctions due to its use by the authorities in Myanmar, the European company Telenor decided to leave the country. Notwithstanding people finding various means to overcome the cut to the flow of information, Myanmar had to bear the economic cost of the crisis. According to NetBlocks estimates, the cost to Myanmar’s economy exceeds USD 24 million per day. The long internet cut also caused a banking crisis as the banks were no longer able to run a full service without digital transactions, while a cash shortage paralysed the economy. The military’s control had already driven half of the country’s population into poverty, according to UN estimates. Economic decline also poses a serious dilemma for the coup leaders — whether they should continue the internet ban that has undermined online digital payments, or continue to seek absolute control of public opinion. The evidence later indicated that nothing is possible in absolute terms. The military’s step-by-step approach to achieving control of information indicates that they will stubbornly defend their interests. New surveillance systems established through the acquisition of new information technology is linked to both the repressive and ideological state apparatus of the military. IMMEDIATE OUTCOMES: IMBALANCED INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE Althusser argues that ISA cannot block the resistance of the exploited classes forever. There are also times that an exploited class tries to reproduce resistance, and may seize “occasions to express itself there, either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in them in struggle”.28 Despite the media restrictions in various forms, the people are acting to balance the information flow by boycotting the government-run media and have staged various campaigns, both online and offline, to 27 “Myanmar’s Military Struggles to Control the Virtual Battlefield”, International Crisis Group, 18 May 2021, available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/ south-east-asia/myanmar/314-myanmars-military-struggles-control-virtual-battlefield. 28 Althusser, “Ideology and the State”, p. 140. 10