While certain restrictions of FoE in cyberspace can and do violate fundamental human rights, the efficacy of such restrictions is questionable. Based on historical analysis Ruijgrok (2016) argues that authoritarian repression on internet realistically doesn’t succeed due to ever-increasing access to the internet and well-coordinated protest activity. MacKinnon’s (2010) ‘networked authoritarianism’ seeks to maintain power and legitimacy in the digitalized world through authoritarian rule, and he argues that the internet has provided people with multiple options to engage in public debates and dialogue despite being under an authoritarian regime with near-to-total control of cyberspace. The use of VPNs, fake profiles, burner phones and alternate sim cards, encrypted messaging apps used by CDM protesters in Myanmar to maintain anonymity and safety are few such examples. Benkler (2006) argues that in a digitalized world, it is increasingly harder for governments to suppress the aspirations of people for democracy and democratic practices. This is particularly true when there is broader access to internet, greater participation and multiple platforms are available for interaction. This, however, doesn’t discount the risk of persecution since rights are inadequately protected under authoritarian rule. is further leveraged by the regime to enhance political legitimacy. This trend is equally true in democratic society among populist leaders (Gandhi, 2018). Ong (2019) argues that due to this culture of silence, activists, politically engaged citizens, journalists, and people tend to avoid expressing opinions and political preferences on social media. Ong further elaborates that selfcensorship is exercised when and if the expected pay-off for expressing one’s opinion online is negative. State-sponsored online repression leading towards self-censorship can pose a risk of democratic backsliding. Authoritarian regimes have historically exercised a ‘state control of the Internet’ approach as an element of a state‘s right to self-governance. Drawing evidence from elsewhere, Kalathil and Boas (2001) underscore that the legacy of authoritarian control is also reflected within internet control and FoE. While democratic governments may struggle to impose effective regulation on internet, authoritarian regimes often dominate the internet and FoE in cyberspace from the beginning and shape its growth and diffusion. For Kalathil and Boas, contrary to Ruijgrok’s view, the question of whether authoritarian regimes can exert control over the internet and FoE is irrelevant. In understanding how misinformation, disinformation6 and hate speech function, several factors are worth pointing out. Particularly during the time of crisis, when established sources and institutions lose or are restricted in their ability to fully ensure credibility, citizens struggle to distinguish if the news is false and can become victims of propaganda (Morgan, 2018). McDermott (2019) relates disinformation to individuals’ psychological tendency toward particular issues, who rely on common sense and intuition that guides their perception of what is correct information, further influenced by repeated circulation within their networks. Due to Myanmar’s long history of authoritarian rule, people are more susceptible to disinformation and rumors play a big role in Myanmar’s sociopolitical domain (Tosa, 2005). Scholars have examined the dual phenomena of online repression and self-censorship under authoritarian rule where there is less or no protection for FoE. The repressive attitude of authoritarian regimes towards FoE in cyberspace has resulted in online self-censorship and in such context, the target of state-controlled online repression encourages self-censorship among anti-regime critics (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013). This 18 Since the introduction of the internet in Myanmar, the regime has maintained strict control over personal access. While this was relaxed during the democratic reform era, since 1st February 2021, the country has witnessed strict and at times total control over internet usage. The widespread use of the internet according to Kalanthil and Taylor (2003) is not an urgent threat to political power. While this may have been true in the pre-coup Myanmar, after the coup the internet and its role in facilitating collaboration and cooperation among anti-coup movements can be said to pose a direct and significant threat to the regime. 6 Misinformation refers to the false information but not with the intention of causing harm. Disinformation is a false information that is created deliberately to cause harm to targeted individuals or groups. While some believe that internet and social media usage in nascent democratic societies can strengthen democratic culture and practices, others point out how it has diminished democratic deliberation. For instance, whilst Abbott’s (2012) optimistic perception of the internet, in that it facilitates democratization and dismantles hierarchies, Garrett (2009) on the other hand, believes that the internet provides a conducive environment for extreme opinions and behaviors. Prior (2007) further highlights that individuals demonstrate selective exposure to information in a high-choice media environment such as the internet, resulting in polarization, hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation (Lau, David, Tessa, Mona, & David, 2017). These technological vulnerabilities in authoritarian regimes are enabled and reinformed by cognitive bias, socio-economic inequalities, ethnic and religious divides, conflict and political clashes particularly prior to elections (Barojan, 2021). In an authoritarian regime, state-controlled media landscapes and information are marked by vulnerabilities. As such, democratic movements in such contexts should also acknowledge emerging soft threats, such as hate speech, misinformation, disinformation and digital manipulation (Barojan, 2021)