reform but also engaged in practices that threaten free expression (PEN Myanmar, 2019). The 2020 report of Athan Myanmar on FoE under the NLDled government found at least 1,051 individuals affected by 539 civil and criminal cases that threatened FoE (Athan Myanmar, 2020). These charges were targeted at peaceful protesters3, labour organizers, journalists, and artists. Additionally, the actions of authorities often mobilized ultra-nationalist sentiment, resulting in harassment and violence against activists and human rights defenders on social media and in person (UNHRC, 2018). 1.4 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COVID-19 The civilian-military government also mis-used the COVID-19 pandemic to further limit space for people to exercise FoE. Several measures put in place to contain the spread of the virus also restricted civil rights and civic space. Vague clauses in legislation originally intended to temporarily limit the spread of misinformation, and limit large gatherings, were utilized to suppress dissenters. The Prevention and Control of Communicable Diseases Law (PCCDL) and the Natural Disaster Management Law (NDML) were used as justification to penalize those criticizing the government response In this way, FoE in Myanmar was further constrained during the COVID-19 crisis, especially online. For instance, Facebook users have been sued under the NDML for posts about community spread of coronavirus before the first case was confirmed (Amnesty International, 2020); sued under section 68(a) of the Telecommunication law for spreading misinformation (Nay Yaing, 2020); sued under Penal Code Article 124(a)20, banning “speeches, writing, posters” and other forms of speech deemed defamatory for the government, for posting that Aung San Suu Kyi and other government officials were not following their own social distancing guidelines (Zue Zue, 2020). 3 12 See, e.g., Progressive Voice’s Time to Hear Our Voices (Progressive Voice, 2018); and Amnesty International’s “‘I Will Not Surrender’ (Amnesty International, 2020a). . Freedoms Persist in Myanmar”, Statement to the 41st Session of the Human Rights Council Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (CIVICUS, 2019). 1.5 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AFTER THE COUP Whilst it might have been repressed before, when the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) illegally seized power on 1st February 2021, FoE completely collapsed. The military junta, calling itself the State Administration Council (SAC), claimed all executive, judicial and legislative power, citing Constitutional provisions for a State of Emergency. The SAC subsequently announced new restrictions on FoE, utilizing and expanding the legal mechanisms mentioned earlier, with a particular focus on the Internet. Following the coup, Myanmar experienced multiple nationwide internet shutdowns; state-owned mobile service providers and telecommunication regulators were placed under direct military control; bans on social media and VPN usage were announced; seven national independent media outlets were ‘outlawed’; surveillance and scrutiny on protestors and activists was expanded, and violent crackdowns were launched on digital activivsts and sympathizers. Attempting to give the appearance of a legitimate government, the SAC announced changes to laws and regulations aimed at curtailing FoE, as well as freedoms of assembly and association. Whilst none of these changes have any legal legitimacy, they included amendments of the Electronic Transactions Law which criminalizes obstructing access to information on digital platforms, particularly that are critical to junta activities. Additionally, amendments of the Penal Code curtail the right to dissent targeting voices that are critical of the military and that support the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). The regime also amended the Telecommunications Law to target activists, journalists, artists, poets, writers, politicians, and others who post perceived criticisms of the regime online. The SAC amended sections 121, 124, and 505 (a) of the Penal Code, introducing harsher penalties, such as longer prison sentences, for those who criticize the junta. Similarly, provisions appeared in the Cyber Security Law (CSL) that further threaten FoE. Numerous reporters have gone into hiding or are openly quitting reporting due to the increased surveillance and growing trend of arbitrary detention by security forces. Whilst the announced changes to the laws noted above provide an indication of the direction of travel the junta is taking Myanmar in, it should be noted that in a climate of general lawlessness, where the judiciary is generally in the pay of the regime, what is written in the laws can seem irrelevant. The authorities will find a way to silence their opponents, with the best fit law to justify their actions being very much an afterthought.Soon after the coup began, “the scale of internet censorship in Myanmar has become quite unprecedented,” wrote Observatory of Network Interference (OONI). OONI’s report confirms that apart from blocks on social media, Wikipedia, and regular internet outages, the regime also blocked COVID-19 sites, denying the right to information that could save lives. The junta went back to its old ways of keeping people in the dark, using a variety of censorship techniques across a variety of networks. OONI concluded an alarming shift in Myanmar’s internet censorship landscape (Xynou, Padmanabhan, Phyu Kyaw, & Filastò, 2021). However, the junta’s attempt to gain absolute control over the internet did not stop at censorship, it is further characterized as growing surveillance, and scrutiny followed by arrests and detention which raise a major human rights concern in the erratic political landscape. 1.6 DIGITAL AND CYBER SPACE IN MYANMAR Over the past decade, cyberspace in Myanmar has emerged as a new avenue not only for everyday space for people but also for civic and political engagement. This has created new pathways for citizens to exercise their right to FoE, but has also led to new restrictions. For instance, Myanmar’s cyberspace has been subject to internet blockages, disruption, and surveillance.

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