began. Signal had a 98% blocking rate, WhatsApp a rate of 97%, and Messenger was blocked 98% of the time. The military was trying to coerce the public into using less secure environments and tools where the military can more easily intercept communications, including access to the media. Telegram and TikTok do not offer end-to-end encryption by default and were blocked only 5% and 12% respectively during the election countdown.9 The military is funnelling the public away from encrypted apps and into a digital trap designed for surveillance and the exposure of whistleblowers This is also a direct threat to the safety of journalists and their sources. Without access to encrypted channels, journalistic activities are exposed to military monitoring, placing whistleblowers and journalists at immediate risk of detention or violence. The blocks are therefore not just a barrier to information but also a mechanism to enable surveillance. Blocking circumvention routes to the media The Myanmar public have shown that they want unrestricted access to the internet. After the military started blocking access, the public quickly turned to circumvention tools to bypass the military blocks. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and other circumvention tools became essential for exercising the right to information, allowing people to bypass military-directed blocks and access independent reporting. Before the elections, prominent circumvention tools were blocked on average 57% of the time. However, tools popular within Myanmar faced even more aggressive targeting by the military. Psiphon, a tool combining VPN, SSH, and HTTP proxy technologies, faced an 88% blocking rate. During the election countdown, average blocking increased to 65%. Popular tools like Proton VPN surged from 82% to 93% blocking during the campaign. The double lock strategy ensures that even when people find a way to bypass the blocks, the military is already there This demonstrated a double lock strategy by the military in an attempt to censor the media. It simultaneously blocked media websites and blocked the circumvention 9 ESET (2025), “Breaking down Telegram’s privacy promise: What’s protected and what’s not”. TikTok (2026), “Direct Messages”. Page 12 of 17