Chicago Journal of International Law Article 31 further notes that a treaty’s preamble should be considered as part of an object and purpose inquiry.70 The preamble to the Rome Statute establishes that the object and purpose of the treaty was to ensure the “effective prosecution” of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” and “to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”71 The States Parties reflected on the 20th century, considering themselves “[m]indful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”72 As evidenced by the relevant treaty law and caselaw, incitement to genocide—by virtue of its close nexus to genocide—has been consistently considered among the world’s most serious crimes.73 The entire point of making incitement itself a crime was to prevent genocide, and such prevention is explicitly contemplated in the Rome Statute’s preamble.74 It therefore makes little sense to halt an analysis of incitement at its location in the Rome Statute and the text of article titles. Rather, the inclusion of incitement at all demonstrates that the international community sought to continue its punishment, consistent with decades of well-developed international law.75 Article 22(2)’s requirement that ambiguities be resolved in favor of the defendant does not lead to a different result.76 Any ambiguity resulting from incitement’s placement in Article 25 is clarified by application of the General Rule of Interpretation, which is not only permitted but also compelled by Article 21. Accordingly, this Comment adopts the CLICC approach to the Rome Statute— incitement is a crime not a mode of liability. 2. Caselaw: the International Military Tribunal and the ICTR In addition to treaty law, caselaw confirms that incitement to genocide is a crime.77 Where treaties fail to expand on incitement’s elements, precedent provides an indispensable tool to understand incitement doctrine. Specifically, decisions by the IMT and the ICTR reveal that in order for the defendant to be convicted of incitement to genocide, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the incitement must be intentional; (2) it must be public; (3) it must be direct; and 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 Id. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at pmbl. Id. See Section II.B.2. Rome Statute, supra note 29, at pmbl. See Section II.B.2. See Rome Statute, supra note 29, at art. 22(2). See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 509–18 (2008). 94 Vol. 21 No. 1