viewed themselves as activists rather than as neutral observers of events, as liberal models of journalism would suggest. Although some journalists were close to the opposition NLD, others outside the party’s tightknit circle were treated with suspicion, despite sharing its pro-democracy aims. In Myanmar’s highly partisan environment, journalists seeking to hold the opposition, as well as the government, to account were ostracized by both sides. The NLD’s suspicion of strangers sharing their democratic sympathies suggests Voltmer’s claims of close relations between the opposition and independent media requires qualification (Table 4). Myanmar’s liberalization was initiated from above as well as from below. Like authoritarian leaders in China and the Soviet Union, Myanmar’s military-backed government pursued liberalization to mitigate societal demands for political change that might otherwise become difficult to control (Mickiewicz, 1997; Steinhardt, 2010). The media were granted new freedoms as a means for the regime to achieve its broader policy objectives, most notably to end Western sanctions. New freedoms were not constitutionally guaranteed. Given the uneven playing field, Myanmar’s journalists differed over how much to accommodate the ruling regime. Some journalists supported unrestrained struggle, while other supported cautious compromise. Those willing to meet the military half way did not align with regime soft liners as Voltmer’s theories predict. Rather these journalists saw reconciliation with the military as the only means to building lasting peace and democracy. This more nuanced understanding of journalists’ motives for sometimes working with the regime is included in my suggestions for refining Voltmer’s theories in Table 4. Although liberalization expanded the range of issues open for critical discussion in the media, the state continued to determine the scope of debate. Despite the abolition of official censorship in 2012, the state retained significant legal means to coerce the media, fostering a culture of self-censorship. Travel restrictions limited access to trouble spots by domestic and international journalists. A culture of suppression and secrecy endured within state institutions despite reforms. Interviewees for this study, however, assert that the state’s lack of capacity for effective communications in part accounts for its ongoing culture of secrecy. The state’s inexperience and weakness at public relations are not mentioned by Voltmer, but are included in my recommendations for expanding her theories in Table 4. Despite introducing commercialization, the state remained the main player in Myanmar’s media market during the country’s liberalization. Financing from international donors and other independent revenue streams were minor in comparison to the economic resources of the state and its business allies. Opposition-operated media were low in circulation and consumed mainly by the converted. Although often serving the political and economic interests of their owners, commercial-media outlets acted as a counterweight to pronouncement in the state-owned media. But as combatants in the factional wars within the ruling regime the commercial media were limited in their watchdog role. The tabloidization unleashed by marketization curtailed the media’s ability to encourage societal reconciliation and to present political alternatives, important functions in an emerging democracy. The negative repercussions of tabloidization are not accounted for in Voltmer’s theories. Their addition to her framework is my last recommendation in Table 4. Voltmer’s theories provide a useful framework for understanding the media’s role as a subject and agent of change in Myanmar’s liberalization. At the same time, as a case study, Myanmar provides insights into how these theories might be expanded and refined in the future. The inauguration of a new government in 2016 notwithstanding, many obstacles remain to achieving a genuinely free media in Myanmar. Some of these challenges, such as self-censorship, are hangovers from the junta period, while others, such as tabloidization, are products of liberalization. The Myanmar media has never functioned as a democratic fourth estate. But although the range of views on offer is far from complete and the operation of the market deeply flawed, the media today provide Myanmar audiences with a form of imperfect pluralism on which to build a more democratic future. Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 41–58 56 Acknowledgements I am grateful to Temple University Faculty Senate and Sophia University, Japan for funding my fieldwork for this study. 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