Ministry of Information in its purchase of printing presses (Nyein, 2014). Minor laws were also used to harass journalists. Officials increasingly used the threat of criminal trespassing charges to prevent reporters probing their activities. In April 2014, a DVB journalist was sentenced to one year in jail on charges of ‘trespassing’ and ‘disturbing an on-duty civil servant’ while reporting on the seemingly innocuous subject of scholarships awarded to Myanmar students by a Japanese foundation (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014c). Cases such as this undoubtedly create anxiety within the media community and influence what journalists do and do not report. In a clear step backwards for media freedom, in March 2014 parliament passed both the Media Act and the Printers and Publishers Regulation Act giving the Ministry of Information ultimate power over what news was permissible to print and sole authority to issue and revoke news publication licenses. Both bills dashed journalists’ hopes that new legislation would liberate the media from state intervention. The Printers and Publishers Regulation Act, similar to the previous junta’s censorship guidelines, banned the publication of materials that ‘insult religion’, ‘disturb the rule of law’, ‘violate the constitution’, ‘incite unrest’ or ‘harm ethnic unity’ (Crispin, 2014). The controversial Act, drafted by the Ministry of Information without consultation with journalist groups, also created a new registrar position with extensive powers to withhold or revoke publishing licenses. Fear of losing their licenses inevitably encouraged selfcensorship among editors, especially in reporting on sensitive topics such as ongoing inter-ethnic tensions and land development.44 Government-imposed travel restrictions further impeded reporting on Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts during the liberalization period. Journalists were typically barred from areas of unrest. Even when not officially banned, it can be dangerous for journalists to travel to conflict zones, as illustrated by the death of freelancer Aung Kyaw Naing, who died in suspicious circumstances while in military custody after reporting from rebel held territory in Mon State (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2014a). Independent media even faced restrictions on covering outwardly uncontroversial events, such as a visit by the King of Norway to Mandalay in December 2014. Journalists from The Voice, Seven Day News, and DVB were barred from sites along the Irrawaddy River, where dozens of poor families had earlier been evicted to avoid blighting the landscape during the king’s visit.45 It was not uncommon for the authorities to limit access to diplomatic events and government ceremonies to state-run media to avoid critical coverage. In March 2014, independent media were barred from the firstever press conference by army chief General Min Aung Hlaing, who took questions only from state-owned outlets (Mann, 2014). 44 45 46 As Voltmer’s theories predict when liberalization comes in response to external pressures, Myanmar’s military-backed government also clamped down on foreign journalists’ access (Table 1). In February 2014, the Ministry of Information reduced the duration of foreign reporters’ visas from three months with multiple entries to one month with a single entry. The move likely came in reaction to international media criticism of government treatment of Rohingya refugees displaced following ethnic clashes in Rakhine in 2012. In some cases, international reporters were denied entry altogether. In March 2014, for example, Time journalist Hannah Beech was refused a visa, probably in response to her cover story the previous year featuring a radical Myanmar Buddhist Monk with the caption ‘The Face of Buddhist Terror’ (Crispin, 2014). 4.4. The Market In Myanmar, consistent with Volmter’s theories of top– down liberalization, the state continued to dominate the media sector despite marketization (Table 1). The independent media that appeared after licensing laws were relaxed depend largely on business elites with government connections for their economic survival. The opposition-operated and foreign-funded media associated with bottom–up and externally-driven liberalization were few in number and limited in influence in Myanmar. Table 3 sets out the financial structures and political connections of Myanmar’s main media outlets at the start of 2015. Prior to the 2015 election, state authorities showed few signs of giving up their controlling influence over the media. The state retained majority control over the television sector, the most popular source of news among urban dwellers. MRTV-4 (owned by the Forever Group) and SkyNet (owned by the Shwe Than Lwin Company) were ostensibly private networks, but were owned by allies of the regime. The formerly exiled satellite broadcaster DVB had a small but growing audience as elections approached.46 In August 2015, parliament ratified a new Broadcasting Law, enabling private companies to enter the broadcast market for the first time. Broadcasters were previously required to partner with the state-owned Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV). The Law, however, maintained government control over the broadcasting sector by granting the president power to appoint members of the new Broadcast Council authorized to issue and revoke broadcast licenses (Freedom House, 2016). State-owned media also continued to dominate in the print sector. The country’s three state-run dailies— which operated as mouthpieces for the regime—had a circulation of more than 320,000, while the more popular private newspapers only sold about 80,000 copies per Author’s interview with The Chronicle editor, December 2014. Author’s interview with The Voice editor, December 2014. Author’s interview with DVB editor, December 2014. Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 41–58 51