8/22/22, 10:18 PM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2019 Country Report | Freedom House C4 0-4 pts Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3/4 Users’ ability to communicate anonymously is limited by the government’s enforcement of SIM card registration requirements. 177 Since 2017, subscribers must provide their name, citizenship ID, birth date, address, nationality, and gender to register for a SIM card; 178 noncitizens must provide their passports. Shortly after the mandatory registration period began in 2017, the MoTC reportedly suspended six million unregistered SIM cards. 179 In March 2019, the government urged mobile service providers to limit each user to two SIM cards in order to protect “personal and national security.” 180 Although its provisions have not yet been implemented for web-only media outlets, the Printing and Publishing Law (2014) could potentially be used to prohibit anonymously run websites (see B6). 181 There are no clear restrictions on encryption, although vague provisions in the Telecommunications Law and the Electronic Transactions Law could be interpreted to restrict the practice. Civil society activists are also concerned that the draft cybersecurity law could restrict encryption (see C2). 182 C5 0-6 pts Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2/6 Despite the fact that Article 357 of the constitution includes protection for private communications, government surveillance remains a serious concern. State surveillance of internet activities using sophisticated technology remains in its infancy in Myanmar because authorities continue to employ more invasive and direct methods to infringe on users’ privacy. The police frequently confiscate the mobile phones of those facing allegations of online criminal activity without a warrant, particularly human rights defenders, political activists, and journalists. 183 The police reportedly demand passwords for social media accounts and other applications from suspects, including in cases where allegations are unrelated to social media use. 184 For example, shortly after Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were arrested (see C3), the police were accused of using Wa Lone’s confiscated phone to send a WhatsApp message on his account. 185 The police used the Israeli phone-breaching product known as Cellebrite to collect data from the journalists’ smartphones. 186 Cellebrite technology has been used by the police since 2016, and although the company ceased selling its products in Myanmar in late 2018, authorities continue to employ the technology. The revelations about Cellebrite also raised concerns about police accessing the journalists’ social media accounts. In February 2018, the parliament approved the creation of the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT), which was later established under the MoTC. 187 The government argued that the SMMT was necessary to counter those causing instability online, including through hate speech and defamation. 188 Public statements by senior government officials in May 2018 stated that the SMMT’s mandate is narrowly focused on targeting foreigners and foreign organizations that cause unrest and threaten the country’s sovereignty through interference. 189 Other analysts have suggested that, given Myanmar’s broader political context, the SMMT was established to surveil foreign activists (including activists from Myanmar who operate outside the country or lack citizenship), foreign media outlets, and international https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2019 15/20