Even before the 2025 law, the military laid the groundwork for mass surveillance. In late 2020, telecom operators and ISPs were compelled to install “lawful intercept” spyware, enabling eavesdropping on calls, texts, emails, and geolocation tracking. Though presented as a crime‐ fighting measure, the system was used to identify and silence political opponents. Since the coup, the military has imposed localised internet and mobile‐data shutdowns—especially in conflict zones—cutting off entire communities from independent news and family networks, thus violating both privacy and information rights. Great Firewall of Myanmar By mid-2024, the military targeted nearly every privacy‐protecting technology. A nationwide VPN block was enforced using Chinese Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) devices that detect and block encrypted traffic. As a result of the new “Great Firewall of Myanmar”, about four million social media interactions abruptly disappeared in the first few months, and over 300 major Facebook pages lost approximately 30 per cent of their engagement. Simultaneously, platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, X, and Instagram have been repeatedly blocked or throttled. These measures force users onto state‐sanctioned networks or unencrypted channels, stripping them of anonymity and exposing them to constant monitoring. The military has also imposed broad licensing requirements on non‐State actors. Any entity offering “cybersecurity services”—a term so vaguely defined it could include NGOs or individual consultants—must obtain a special license or face fines, imprisonment, or shutdown. Platforms with over 100,000 users must secure government approval, which remains undisclosed and is governed by military committees rather than courts. Through this regime, the junta can inspect, suspend, or ban virtually any website or app on vague “cybersecurity” grounds. Most telecom and internet companies, many of which are already directly or indirectly controlled by the military, comply to avoid being cut off entirely. Military influence Control over telecommunications infrastructure compounds these abuses. Major providers, including State‐owned MPT, military‐owned MyTel, and other notionally independent vendors, operate under military influence. Before Telenor’s forced sale in July 2022 to a military‐linked buyer, executives had warned that there were no legal safeguards for customer privacy. Now, SIM re‐registration requires linking every phone number to a National Registration Card (NRC) and a facial photograph. In sum, Myanmar’s military regime has created a near‐total surveillance state. Through draconian cyber laws, infrastructure control, and sophisticated monitoring technologies, the military has eliminated any practical distinction between private and public life online. With no independent oversight, every digital interaction—from phone calls to social media browsing—is subject to interception, censorship, and punishment. The right to privacy, once constitutionally guaranteed, has been reduced to a hollow promise, replaced by a pervasive apparatus of state surveillance and control.