Impact on Internet Freedoms On 8 April, the military issued a ban on using PSI satellite dishes that allow people to access local news outlets, especially the DVB and Mizzima, which continue to report on daily protests (The Irrawaddy, 2021b). In residential areas, there were reported cases of authorities visiting electronic shops and trespassing private residences to confiscate satellite dishes (Prachatai, 2021). On 4 June 2021, a shutdown was in place at the same time as the National Unity Government organised a press conference, during which they condemned the coup and called to dismantle the military and reinstate a democratic government. The growth of the telecommunications sector saw an increased reliance on the internet and other digital services for businesses. Consequently, the internet blackouts were damaging to the digitalised economy of Myanmar, reducing the ease of business engagement in the country. The shutdowns, which lasted for a total duration of 3,830 hours from 15 February to 28 May, were estimated to account for a loss of $2.1b USD (Woodhams & Migliano, 2021). To protect the economy whilst controlling the use of the internet for political purposes, the Tatmadaw allowed provisional internet access for business activities from 27 April 2021. Microsoft Office and banking applications were made available to the public and businesses, deemed essential for the economy to function (KrASIA, 2021). The Tatmadaw has been actively pursuing an ‘intranet’ strategy by only allowing a handful of online services to be accessible using mobile data. On 25 May, a ‘whitelist’ of 1200 services was released which dictated which online services were allowed to continue operating. With over 300 websites allowed to operate, the business sector has been the most privileged. Entertainment, dating and gaming applications were allowed to run again (Strangio, 2021). While Facebook and Twitter were banned as they were identified as a place of coordination for pro-democracy protesters, other social media platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp and Viber were allowed to operate again. The reason advanced for the whitelisting of WhatsApp and Viber was that these applications were mostly used for business purposes (Nikkei Asia, 2021). The large focus on business apps reinforces that the military has been under pressure to re-establish economic stability in the country. However, whether the implementation of an intranet will allow the military to salvage the economic performances of the country remains dubious at best. Indeed, while China has been successful in keeping their internet sealed off, it has come at a great cost. Myanmar does not have similar capacities, economic resources or alternative internet services as in China or Russia. Moreover, these restrictions will not only deter foreign investments, but also innovation within the country. In the long term, if this occurred the nascent e-commerce and start-up sectors would simply disappear and damage Myanmar’s economy (Crisis Group Asia, 2021). 3b. Violation of Privacy Under NLD rule in 2015, the telecommunications company ‘MyTel’ was formed; a joint venture between the Burmese military and the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence. It quickly became one of the largest telecommunication providers in Myanmar due to unfair pricing strategies and compelling incentives such as allowing subscribers to stream the English Premier League, a football (soccer) tournament that is hugely popular in Myanmar. To access the streaming content and other services that MyTel provides on their ‘My ID Digital Hub’ application, users are forced to accept a number of intrusive application permissions, including audio recording, Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, access to photos and videos, contacts, and the ability to read USB content storage. A report from Justice for Myanmar reveals that it is almost certain the expansive personal data collected is being handled by MyTel and analysed in conjunction with the Vietnamese military (Justice for Myanmar, 2020). These arrangements have been beneficial for the Tatmadaw, with the information gathered on users enabling targeted crackdowns on dissidents since the coup (Potkin & Mcpherson, 2021). 15